Should the Criminal Defendant Be Assigned a Seat in Court? by Shepard, Steven
TH AL LAW JORAL
COMMENT
Should the Criminal Defendant Be Assigned a Seat in
Court?
Photo courtesy of The Houston Chronicle
This somber courtroom in Houston's Bob Casey Federal Building has been
the site of legal arguments for nearly fifty years This January, however, the
room itself became the subject of legal argument when attorney Michael
Ramsey requested seats for himself and his client at the table on the left, closest
to the jury box and directly across from the witness stand.2 Defendants should
sit at that table, Ramsey argued, in order to have "an unimpeded, unobstructed
1. Ed Asher, "Ugly" Design Let Building Escape Flood, CHRON.COM (Houston), June 15, 2001,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/storm2oo1/944664.html.
2. Letter from Michael Ramsey to Judge Simeon Lake, U.S. Dist. Court, S. Dist. of Tex. (Jan.
17, 20o6), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2oo6/an/enron-table-letter.pdf.
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and uncluttered 'face-to-face' confrontation with the witnesses against them. 3
Perhaps because Ramsey's client was Kenneth Lay, the former head of the
defunct Enron Corporation and the prime target of a four-year federal task
force,4 the U.S. Attorney promptly responded to Ramsey's request with a brief
arguing that Lay must remain where defendants "traditionally" sit, at the table
farthest from the jury box.'
Judge Simeon Lake settled the dispute two days before voir dire began. In
Houston, as in other federal districts, the prosecution is by custom permitted
to sit at the table near the jury, though no local rule requires this arrangement. 6
"Since there is no law to guide me in this weighty decision," Judge Lake said,
"fairness and common sense" led him to allow the prosecutors to sit at the
closer table when presenting their case, and to grant the defendants the same
privilege during their presentation. 7 As it happened, Lay and his codefendant
chose to remain at the far table!
In this Comment I question the U.S. Attorney's claim that every criminal
defendant should be required to sit at the table farthest from the jury.
Courtroom seating is properly within a trial judge's discretion, 9 and there are
good reasons for seating some criminal defendants far from the jury.'" Yet
3. Id. at 1. In Judge Lake's courtroom, the table closest to the jury has the best view of the
witness box. Ramsey argued that by giving Lay the near seat, Judge Lake would "give life
and vitality to the core Constitutional value of 'face-to-face' confrontation." Id. (citing Coy
v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988)).
4. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Enron Chief Accounting Officer Richard
Causey Pleads Guilty to Securities Fraud (Dec. 28, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2oo5/December/o5_crm_695.html.
s. Government's Opposition to Defendants' Motion Concerning Courtroom Seating, United
States v. Skilling, H-o4 -CR-o25SS (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 20o6) [hereinafter Government's
Opposition].
6. See S.D. TEX. LOCAL R., App. C., available at http://www.txsd.uscourts.gov/dclclrl/dclr2oos.
pdf (describing proper courtroom etiquette but not referring to seating).
7. Mary Flood, Lawyers To Share Table Near Jury, CHRON.COM (Houston), Jan. 26, 20o6,
http://www.chron.conVdisp/story.mpl/special/enron/3616o78.html.
8. Posting of Mary Flood to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.coni/enrontrialwatch
(Apr. 3, 2006, 19:42 CST).
9. See, e.g., Mahon v. Prunty, No. 96-55411, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2122, at *6 (9 th Cir. Feb. 6,
1997) ("[T]he court did not abuse its discretion by seating defendants closer to the jury.");
United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 122o, 1226 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Where . . . [defense]
counsel makes an objection to the seating arrangements, a trial judge may deem it
appropriate to make the choice by some more neutral way than tradition or a race to the
'best' seat.").
1o. The jurors' safety is a paramount concern, and some courtrooms are built in such a way that
dangerous defendants are more easily controlled at the farther table. See, e.g., AM. BAR AsS'N
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there are also persuasive arguments, grounded in history and precedent, for
why a trial judge should allow a well-behaved criminal defendant to choose for
himself where he will sit. In Part I, I suggest that the criminal defendant's
autonomy to choose his seat is an important aspect of the American courtroom
tradition. In Part II, I argue that the defendant's well-established freedom to
control some aspects of his appearance before the jury-by wearing civilian
clothes rather than prison garb, for example -implies a freedom to choose the
place of his appearance as well. Part III addresses the government's response to
Ramsey's letter.
I. THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S JOURNEY FROM DOCK TO
COUNSEL TABLE
Over the last two centuries American courts have granted the criminal
defendant more and more autonomy to choose where he will sit during trial.
Our courts have allowed the defendant first to leave the "prisoner's dock" - the
railed pen in which he once stood during trial - and then to join his lawyer on
the other side of the "bar," even as England and Canada have continued to
confine the defendant in the dock.1 The scope and consistency of this trend
suggests that assigning the criminal defendant to a particular seat is out of
keeping with American tradition.
Abolishing the prisoner's dock was a decisive break with historical practice,
because the dock was nearly as old as the English courtroom itself. Fifteenth-
century illustrations of an English criminal trial show the accused standing
front-and-center before the judges, with a marshal at his side."2 He has
& AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS JOINT COMM. ON THE DESIGN OF COURTROOMS & FACILITIES,
THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE: PLANNING AND DESIGN FOR THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 223 (1973)
[hereinafter THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE] (describing the state courthouse in Marin
County, California). Another concern is that scary or unattractive defendants may well
prefer to sit farther away from the jury's scrutiny.
ii. See Lynal E. Doerksen, Out of the Dock and into the Bar: An Examination of the History and Use
of the Prisoner's Dock, 32 CRIM. L.O. 478 (199o) (recounting the history of the dock in
Canadian courts and recommending its abolition); see also THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS. OF
ENG. & WALES, GOING TO COURT-INFORMATION FOR YOU 13-14 (2004),
available at http://www.cjsonline.gov.uk/defendant/your-case/going-to-court/index.html
(follow "English" hyperlink) (illustrating modern English courts); Lionel Rosen, The Dock-
Should It Be Abolished?, 29 MOD. L. REv. 289 (1966) (advocating abolition of the dock in
England).
12. CLARE GRAHAM, ORDERING LAW: THE ARCHITECTURAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW COURT TO 1914, at 20 fig.3 (2003) (reproducing a mid-fifteenth-century
illumination of the King's Bench).
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remained there ever since, even as the elaborate architecture of the English
courthouse has grown up around him. 3
Though the dock survived the Atlantic crossing, 14 and lingered in the
courthouses of the eastern seaboard well into the twentieth century,"5 by the
end of the nineteenth century most American courts had ceased to confine the
criminal defendant during trial.16 Today, the American criminal defendant sits
with his lawyer at a counsel table positioned to reflect equal status with the
prosecution's table.
17
Once freed from the dock, the American criminal defendant then crossed
the bar that separated spectators from participants, and took a seat beside his
lawyer. One such migration is recorded in a decision of the Tennessee Superior
Court in 18o6. That court believed that the "proper place" for a prisoner who
was "in custody" was behind the bar, because "[s]trictly speaking, no person
has a right to go into the bar but attorneys.' ', 8 Nevertheless, the court conceded
that the old custom was changing, and permitted a prisoner on bail to cross the
bar and sit beside his lawyer.' 9
13. Surviving plans of seventeenth-century courthouses show a prisoner's dock, located far
away from the lawyers in the "well." Id. at 82-84, 87-88 (reproducing plans of English
assizes). Graham has argued that it is likely that a similar enclosure was used as early as the
sixteenth century; the term "dock" was first recorded in 1586. Id. at 55.
14. A 1763 floor plan of the Salem, Massachusetts courthouse shows a dock, positioned well
away from the lawyers' tables. MARTHA J. MCNAMARA, FROM TAVERN TO COURTHOUSE:
ARCHITECTURE & RITUAL IN AMERICAN LAW, at fig.I.7 (2004); see also United States v.
Gilbert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204) (Story, J.) (noting that in
Salem "the usual place for prisoners, in all capital cases, is in the dock, or prisoner's bar"). A
dock also appears in the circular courtroom of the Old Berkshire County Courthouse, built
in 1815 in Lenox, Massachusetts. THE AMERicAN COURTHOUSE, supra note lo, at 234
(reproducing the floor plan). The Old New Castle County Courthouse in New Castle,
Delaware, built in 1730, also contained a dock that, though not elevated, was cordoned off
from the lawyers' tables by railings. Id. at 232 (reproducing a sketch of the courthouse).
15. See, e.g., State v. Kupis, 179 A. 641 (Del. 1935) (reffising, on an interlocutory appeal, the
defendant's request to leave the dock as "contrary to the well settled practice in this state").
But see Young v. Callahan, 70o F.2d 32, 36 n.5 (1st Cir. 1983) ("We understand that ... the
dock... is no longer used in Delaware during the course of a trial.").
16. Joel Prentiss Bishop, in the 1895 edition of his treatise on criminal procedure, opined that
"probably" the "strict English rules" on where a prisoner must stand were no longer
enforced in U.S. courts, "[a]nd so, the author submits, it should be." JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
NEW CRMINAL PROCEDURE S 954, at 57 2 (4 th ed. 1895).
17. DON HARDENBERGH, THE COURTHOUSE: A PLANNING AND DESIGN GUIDE FOR COURT
FAClLrrIES 75 (1998) (recommending designs for state courthouses).
18. State v. Underwood, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 92 (18o6).
19. Id.
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The dock disappeared in part because the earliest American trials were held
in taverns, meetinghouses, town halls, and private homes, which lacked the
elaborate English furniture,2" and in part, perhaps, because an emerging
egalitarian spirit rebelled at the idea of denying the defendant the autonomy to
choose his own seat. Breaking with the English custom, American courts
permitted the criminal defendant first to leave the dock, and then to pass over
the bar and sit at the lawyers' tables. It would be in keeping with that tradition
to allow him one step more, over to the table near the jury.
II. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO "PRESENT HIMSELF IN HIS BEST
POSTURE"
Most states got rid of their docks one courthouse at a time, and without
appellate litigation." When a defendant did try to argue his way out of the
dock, his most successful claim appears to have been that the distance between
his pen and the counsel table impeded his right to consult with his lawyer," an
argument that may also have been the most convenient constitutional
shorthand through which appellate courts could express their distaste for
assigned seats. 3
20. MCNAMARA, supra note 14, at 11-22 (relying on sources from Massachusetts). Virginia's
colonial courts did not use a dock, but instead brought the defendant to stand before the
clerk's table in shackles. CARL R. LOUNSBURY, THE COURTHOUSES OF EARLY VIRGINIA 155
(2005). Only later, in the early eighteenth century, did some Virginia courthouses place him
in a prisoner's box. Id. at 164.
21. For example, Delaware's New Castle County had used a dock since at least 1730. THE
AMERICAN COURTHOUSE, supra note lo, at 232. In 1881, the county built a new courthouse in
Wilmington- but without a dock. The change was made easily and without fuss. Telephone
Interview with Cindy Snyder, Site Manager, Old New Castle County Courthouse (Feb. 17,
2006).
22. E.g., Commonwealth v. Boyd, 92 A. 705, 706 (Pa. 1914) (rejecting the defendant's argument
that the dock prejudiced the jury against him, and instead holding that the dock violated his
"common-law right" to consult with his lawyer); see also People v. Zammora, 152 P.2d 18o,
211-15 (Cal. 1944) (holding that an unusual arrangement of tables-deemed a "dock" by
defense counsel at trial-violated the defendants' right under the state constitution to
defend themselves "with counsel"); Rosen, supra note ii, at 294-95 (reporting that by the
196os, most attorneys general believed that a dock would violate defendants' right to
counsel).
23. By using the right-to-counsel argument, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could remove
the dock without requiring a new trial. Because Boyd presented no defense and attempted
no cross-examinations, the court held that the dock's infringement of Boyd's right to
counsel was harmless error. Boyd, 92 A. at 705-o6. If the court had instead adopted Boyd's
fair trial argument, then it may have been more difficult to avoid a new trial by calling the
error harmless.
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Finally, in 1983, the First Circuit called the dock what it was: prejudicial.
Relying on Estelle v. Williams,' the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Due Process Clause prohibits a state from forcing a defendant to wear
prison garb to court, the First Circuit held that the dock was, like prison garb,
"a 'brand of incarceration' which is inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence."2" It is now well settled that the Due Process Clause forbids the state
from forcing a well-behaved defendant to appear before the jury in a way that
suggests his guilt.2
6
A corollary of that proposition is that the defendant has an affirmative right
to control his appearance. Thus, a district court has held that members of a
religious cult may wear their uniforms to trial -even when those uniforms
might intimidate the jury. 7 Florida's courts have held that a criminal
defendant has a First Amendment right to wear sweatshirts with religious
symbols.S Virginia's courts have held it an abuse of discretion to refuse an
active duty naval officer permission to wear his dress uniform, because "it is
inappropriate for a trial court to deny a courtroom participant the right to
present himself in his best posture."29 These cases tacitly acknowledge the
obvious point: A defendant's appearance matters to the jury and can affect the
outcome of a trial. If the state is forbidden from forcing a defendant to look
guilty, then the state ought not to prevent him from looking innocent.
And if a defendant is permitted to choose the clothes that he will be seen
wearing, then he should also be allowed to choose where, and at what distance,
he will be seen, because his proximity to the jury will have enormous influence
on how the jurors perceive him. In Judge Lake's courtroom, a defendant sitting
at the near table is within what anthropologist Edward T. Hall termed "social
distance" of the jurors, while a defendant seated at the far table is relegated to
what Hall called "public distance."3 ° Hall argued that proximity matters: Social
24. 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).
25. Young v. Callahan, 700 F.2d 32, 36 (ist Cir. 1983) (vacating the state court conviction). But
see Moore v. Ponte, 186 F. 3d 26, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant's
confinement in the dock during his 1976 murder trial did not violate the Due Process Clause
because the trial judge based his decision to use the dock on "security concerns" and gave a
curative instruction).
26. See also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1986) (noting that shackling should be
permitted "only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial").
27. United States v. Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
28. Joseph v. State, 642 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
29. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.zd 819,821 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
30. EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966). Hall identified four zones of space
around the person: "intimate distance" (from six to eighteen inches); "personal distance"
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distance is used by "people who work together,"3' while persons at a public
distance are outside the "circle of involvement" and are more likely to be
perceived in a "formal style."32 Professor Jeffrey S. Wolfe conducted his own
test of juror perceptions and found that jurors consider lawyers to be more
effective when they stand within social distance.33 Manuals on trial advocacy
agree with Wolfe's findings, and recommend that lawyers take the table
nearest the jury M and deliver their arguments within social distance of the jury
box.3" This evidence suggests that, especially in small courtrooms, where one
sits matters as much as what one wears. For the same reasons that we permit
the defendant to wear his Sunday best, so too should we allow him to choose a
seat near the jurors who will judge him.
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR ASSIGNED SEATS ARE NOT PERSUASIVE
In its response to Ramsey's letter, the government warned Judge Lake that
if Lay were to sit near the jury, he might "interact more freely with the jury
through non-evidentiary means." 36 Certainly if Lay were to chat up the jurors,
that would indeed be a problem -but assuming, as seems fair, that Lay would
(from eighteen inches to four feet); "social distance" (from four to twelve feet); and "public
distance" (over twelve feet away). Id. at 108-22.
31. Id. at 115.
32. Id. at 116; see also Stuart Albert & James M. Dabbs, Jr., Physical Distance and Persuasion, 15 J.
PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 265, 269 (1970) (discussing the effect of proximity on
"persuasion").
33. Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The Effect of Location in Courtroom on Jury Perception of Lawyer Performance,
21 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 769-71 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Stephen W. Comiskey, A Good Lawyer: Secrets Good Lawyers (and Their Best Clients)
Already Know, 66 TEx. B.J. 338, 340 (2003) ("Arrive early enough.., to claim the counsel
table closest to the jury."); see also United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1226 n.4 (8th Cir.
1989) ("[Llegal folklore often expounds that advantages can be reaped from... occupying
the counsel table nearer the jury.").
35. RONALD J. MATLON, COMMUNICATION IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 191-92 (1988); see also THOMAS
A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 4.3(7), at 72 (6th ed. 2000) (recommending that a lawyer
deliver opening arguments from a position a few feet away from the jury); L. TIMOTHY
PERRIN ET AL., THE ART & SCIENCE OF TRIAL ADVOCACY 155-56 (2003) (same).
36. Government's Opposition, supra note 5, at 2. The government also argued that the
prosecutor is entitled to the closer table because he bears the burden of proof. See id. at 3; see
also United States v. Nava-Salazar, 735 F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. 111. 199o) ("[T]he
government has traditionally been given the option of sitting closest to the jury because it
bears the burden of proof."). It is hard to see how the burden of proof is relevant to seating
arrangements, however.
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behave himself and sit quietly, why should his presence there be considered
"non-evidentiary"?
There is good reason to think that a defendant's appearance, posture, and
facial expressions are evidence, and ought to be considered by the jury. The
Supreme Court has long acknowledged that a jury will weigh and consider the
defendant's physical appearance, even if the defendant never leaves his seat at
the counsel table.37 In this trial, because Lay does plan to leave his seat and to
testify in his defense, 3s his credibility will be a central issue. His nonverbal
reactions to hostile witnesses are "relevant" to his credibility under Federal
Rule of Evidence 401. 31 Judge Lake's decision to offer Lay a seat at the near
table during his own case is laudable, but less than ideal: Lay's presence at the
near table would have been most relevant during his confrontation with the
witnesses against him, which occurred during the prosecution's case.
CONCLUSION
The seating arrangements of a courtroom are within the trial judge's
discretion. When exercising that discretion, a judge should weigh a number of
concerns, some of which-safety of jurors, for example, or avoidance of
prejudice -may well lead her to seat a criminal defendant far from the jury.
When a well-behaved defendant asks to sit near the jury, however, a judge
should not deny his request on the basis of custom alone. By granting the
defendant the autonomy to choose his own seat, a judge honors America's
historic break with the English practice of confining the defendant in the dock,
respects the defendant's right to appear before the jury in his best posture, and
provides the jury with relevant, nonverbal evidence from the defendant's
confrontation with hostile witnesses.
STEVEN SHEPARD
37. In a multidefendant trial, when one defendant confesses before trial and implicates his
codefendant, that confession cannot be introduced at their joint trial, even with a clear
limiting instruction. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). The Bruton rule also
applies to confessions that physically describe, but do not name, the codefendant.
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1969). Harrington tacitly acknowledges the
obvious: The jury will look at the codefendant seated at the counsel table.
38. Transcript of Proceedings at 17, United States v. Skilling, H-o4-CR-o25SS (S.D. Tex. Jan.
31, 20o6), available at http://www.kenlayinfo.com/upload/
ramseyopeningstatementwebsiteo6o131_59786.pdf (statement of Michael Ramsey).
39. Even if those reactions are deemed "character" evidence, they are still admissible because
they are "offered by [the] accused." FED. R EVID. 404(a)(1).
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